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CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE AS DEFENSE TO
VIOLATION OF STATUTE
By WILLIAM L. PROSSER*
D art v. Pure Oit Co.' is by way of being a celebrated case. After
it was once argued before the supreme court of Minnesota,
Justice Youngdahl left the bench to become governor. Whether
on his departure the court found itself evenly divided as to the
disposition of the case, whether its possible implications made the
judges desire to be sure of their ground before coming to a decision,
or whether there were other reasons for seeking further clarifica-
tion of the issues, is of course a matter of conjecture. For whatever
reason, the court ordered the case rebriefed and reargued, and took
the unusual step of inviting three members of the bar of Minnesota2
to file briefs as amici curiae. As word spread around the state that
the decision might be of considerable importance in the field of tort
litigation, other attorneys became interested and asked leave to file
additional briefs as amici. All such requests were granted, and in
the end the court found itself with a large number of friends. Alto-
gether some eighteen individual attorneys and firms3 appeared in
the case.
Its essential facts were quite simple. The defendant Pure Oil
*Professor of Law, Harvard University. On leave of absence first
semester, 1946-7.
1. (Minn. 1947) 27 N. W. (2d) 555.
2. Mr. De Parcq, Mr. Mulally, and the writer.
3. The alignment was as follows:
For the plaintiff: Charles T. Wangensteen of Chisholm; David A. Bour-
gin and Gust A. Koski of Virginia; William H. De Parcq of Minneapolis;
T. 0. Streissguth of New Ulm; Frank E. McAllister, John Edmund Burke
and Clifford W. Gardner of St. Paul.
For the defendant: W. 0. Bissonett and the firm of Gillette, Nye, Harries
& Montague of Duluth; J. H. Mulally and Philip Stringer of St. Paul;
Wright W. Brooks, Paul 3. McGough and the firm of Faegre & Benson of
Minneapolis; Roger L. Dell and Chester G. Rosengren of Fergus Falls.
For the defendant on the law and the plaintiff on the facts: the writer.
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Company sold to the Dispen Grocery a quantity of what purported
to be kerosene, and the Dispen Grocery resold a can of it to the
plaintiff's intestate. There was evidence that the liquid in the can
was a mixed product containing some gasoline, with a flash point
falling within the statutory definition of gasoline, 4 and that its sale
as kerosene violated a Minnesota statute.5 There was also evidence,
nearly all of its circumstantial, that the defendant had violated other
provisions of the statute6 by delivering gasoline in a container
which was not painted red, by not painting its gasoline pipes red,
by not attaching red tags to the gasoline faucets of its tank wagons,
and by pumping gasoline through the pipes used for other petro-
leum products. Plaintiff's intestate made use of the liquid in the
can to start a fire, and was killed by the resulting explosion. There
was evidence, again almost entirely circumstantial, tending to
show that he was negligent in doing so.
On this record the trial court directed a verdict for the de-
fendant and denied a motion for a new trial. In his accompanying
memorandum Judge Hughes concluded that the evidence clearly
showed that the intestate had knowingly poured the liquid 'upon an
open flame, and that even though he believed it to be kerosene this
was contributory negligence as a matter of law. On appeal plain-
tiff's counsel boldly contended that whenever an action is founded
upon intentional acts of the defendant which violate a statute, it
must be regarded as an action for an intentional or "wilful" tort,
to which contributory negligence cannot be a defense.
It was this contention which engaged the attention of the su-
preme court and led it to call upon its friends. If the contention
were to be upheld, it is obvious that the consequences would be
sweeping. In nearly all automobile cases, in nearly all railway
cases, in many street railway cases, in many cases of accidents
arising out of the condition of premises or the sale of goods or fires
or explosions or unusual events of any kind, the action is founded
upon the defendant's violation of a statute. In fact it is safe to
say that today negligence actions are very much in the minority in
which there is not some claim of violation of a statute, ordinance
or regulation. Viewed in this light the contention was no less than a
challenge to the entire doctrine of contributory negligence and a
proposal for its abolition in the majority of negligence cases. Coun-
sel who came to the aid of the plaintiff argued persuasively that the
4. Minn. Stats. 1945, § 296.01, subd. 3.
5. Minn. Stats. 1945, § 296.05, subd. 2.
6. Minn. Stats. 1945, § 296.22, subds. 1, 2 and 3.
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progress of the law, in Minnesota as elsewhere, has been in this
direction, that the step had already been taken in Flaherty v. Great
Northern Ry. Co.,7 about which there is more to say later, and that
the state was now ready to have the rule declared.
As the battle of the briefs developed, an additional argument
was advanced on behalf of the plaintiff, to the effect that the
particular statute involved was enacted for the purpose of protect-
ing purchasers of petroleum products from their own "inability to
exercise self-protective care," and that under the rule stated by
the Restatement of the Law of Torts8 and previously recognized
by the Minnesota court," the legislature must be taken to have in-
tended that contributory negligence should not be available as a
defense. Over this contention also, much ink was shed by interested
and industrious advocates on both sides.
The decision rejected both contentions, and concluded that the
defense of contributory negligence was open to the defendant. It was
held, however, that on the evidence in the record the issue of con-
tributory negligence was one of fact for the jury, and that it was
error to direct the verdict. The case was sent back for a new trial.
The opinion of Justice Frank Gallagher is a painstaking effort to
review and classify the law upon the whole problem of contributory
negligence as a defense where a statute is violated. Some con-
sideration of it may be in order.
VIOLATION OF STATUTE AS A TORT
There has been much discussion ° of the theoretical problem of
why the violation of a purely criminal statute which says nothing
about tort liability should ever give rise to it. The reason usually
given by the courts is that the legislature intended to provide such
liability, or that such an intent is to be "presumed." Ordinarily this
is the barest fiction, since the obvious conclusion to be drawn from
the silence of the statute as to any civil remedy is that the legislators
intended not to provide, it, or at least that they did not have the
question in mind and bad no intentions at all. Anyone who has met
with legislative committees or has had any experience in drafting
statutes will have a strong suspicion that the latter is the truth.
7. (1944) 218 Minn. 488, 16 N. W. (2d) 553.
8. Section 483.
9. In Mayes v. Byers, (1943) 214 Minn. 54, 7 N. W. (2d) 403.
10. Thayer, Public Wrong and Private Action, (1914) 27 Harv. L.
Rev. 317; Lowndes, Civil Liability Created by Criminal Legislation, (1932)
16 Minn. L. Rev. 361; Morris, The Relation of Criminal Statutes to Tort
Liability, (1933) 46 Harv. L. Rev. 453; Notes, (1932) 32 Col. L. Rev. 713;(1935) 19 Minn. L. Rev. 666; (1928) 13 Corn. L. Q. 634.
1948]
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Again, it is said that the reasonable man will obey the criminal
law, and that one who does not is not acting as a reasonable man,
and therefore must be negligent. This is a poor explanation for the
cases in which criminal statutes have been held to give rise to actions
for trespass, fraud or other torts not based on negligence at all, or
for the refusal to permit even a negligence action where the statute
is found not to be intended to protect the class of persons in which
the plaintiff is included," or not to be intended to protect them
against the particular risk.1 2 It breaks down entirely in the occa-
sional case 3 where the court has rebelled against a preposterous
statute such as a speed limit of six miles an hour still on the books,
and has refused to permit even a finding of negligence by the jury.
No doubt the most tenable explanation is that the court finds in
the statute "an expression of a policy for the protection of a par-
ticular class of people against the forbidden conduct, and that in
furtherance of that policy it is proceeding by a species of judicial
legislation well grounded in precedent, to afford an additional
remedy of its own. If there has to be a theory, this one at least
preserves some leeway for discrimination, and avoids the strait-
jacket of any reasoning which would result in a rigid rule allowing
a tort action for all damage resulting from any criminal act.
All of the discussion has centered around actions for negligence.
It seems almost entirely to have overlooked the fact that a viola-
tion of a statute is not necessarily to be classified as negligence, but
may afford a basis for actions for other torts. The opinion in the
Dart Case is unique, so far as the writer can discover, in its recogni-
tion of this fact. It begins by saying' 4 that
"Broadly speaking and subjedt to exceptions and limitations as
applied to it, when a statute is passed the courts generally tend to
associate it with the type of common-law liability most closely re-
11. Hamilton v. Minneapolis Desk Mfg. Co., (1899) 78 Minn. 3, 80
N. W. 693; Everett v. Great Northern R. Co., (1907) 100 Minn. 369,
111 N. W. 281; Westlund v. Iverson, (1922) 154 Minn. 52, 191 N. W. 253;
Akers v. Chicago, St. P., M. & 0. R. Co., (1894) 58 Minn. 540, 60 N. W. 669.
12. Gorris v. Scott, (1874) L. R. 9 Ex. 125; Robertson v. Yazoo &
M. V. R. Co., (1929) 154 Miss. 182, 122 So. 371 ; Crosby v. Great Northern
R. Co., (1932) 187 Minn. 263, 245 N. W. 31; Ingalsbe v. St. Louis-San
Francisco R. Co., (1922) 295 Mo. 177, 243 S. W. 323, 24 A. L. R. 1051;
Larrimore v. American Nat. Ins. Co., (1939) 184 Okla. 614, 89 P. (2d) 340.
13. Stevens v. Luther, (1920) 105 Neb. 184, 180 N. W. 87. Cf. Walker
v. Lee, (1921) 115 S. C. 495, 106 S. E. 682; Malloy v. New York Real Estate
Association, (1898) 156 N. Y. 265, 50 N. E. 853 (reasonable substitute safe-
guard). The Kentucky rule that violation of an ordinance is not even evi-
dence of negligence may be traced to a speed limit of six miles an hour.
Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Dalton, (1897) 102 Ky. 290, 43 S. W. 431, 19 Ky.
L. Rep. 1318.
14. Dart v. Pure Oil Co., (Minn. 1947) 27 N. W. (2d) 555, 558.
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lated to the statute. For example, a statute prohibiting going on
property and cutting timber is thought of as in the classification of
a trespass statute; one prohibiting the receiving of bank deposits,
after insolvency as a fraud statute; one prohibiting the blocking of
public highways as a public nuisance statute; and one laying down
rules of safety for the protection of the public or any class or group
of individuals, as in the present case, as a negligence statute."
This is obviously right, and it is surprising that no one appears
to have said it before. Its truth is most evident where the statute
merely enacts a rule already existing at common law. Even in the
absence of a statute drivers must keep to the right side of the road,
and when they do not do so they are found to be negligent. When
the legislature declares the rule it does not change the nature or
theory of the action to be brought for its violation. At most it re-
moves any possible doubt as to the rule and takes away from the
jury any issue as to whether such conduct is negligence. At com-
mon law the acceptance of deposits by the directors of an insolvent
bank falls in the category of fraud, as non-disclosure of a fact
which they are under a duty to disclose. When such conduct is
penalized by statute the nature of the civil action which will lie for
it, whether it be in deceit, quasi-contract or constructive trust, is not
changed. When the legislature goes beyond existing rules and estab-
lishes new ones, as for example by a blue sky law,"1 or a statute
prohibiting the operation of buses or taxis without a license,"' the
courts must inevitably tend, so far as the civil action for the viola-
tion is concerned, to look for the field of tort liability which it most
nearly resembles and into which it would fall if the rule had de-
veloped at common law. The process is a natural one, and perhaps
the only resort in the absence of a more definite guide in the statute
itself.
It follows that the violation of a statute is not always to be classi-
fied as negligence. It may be treated as trespass, conversion, fraud,
nuisance, libel or slander, malicious prosecution or perhaps any
other tort. All of the rules, qualifications, limitations, exceptions
15. "The action is in tort according to the Supreme Court of Minne-
sota. The basis of the tort is fraud. The fraud consisted of sales of corporate
stock to the plaintiff without divulging to him that it was not registered
as required by the Minnesota law. * * * When an express provision of the
law is violated in a sale of securities subject to registration under the Blue
Sky Law, the term 'fraud' is an appropriate characterization of the dis-
obedience." Shepard v. City Co. of New York, (D.C. Minn. 1938) 24 F. Supp.
682. Accord, Hertz Drivurself Stations v. Ritter, (C.C.A. 9th 1937) 91 F.(2d) 539; MacDonald v. Reich & Lievre, Inc., (1929) 100 Cal. App. 736, 281
Pac. 106.
16. Puget Sound Traction, L. & P. Co. v. Grassmeyer, (1918) 108
Wash. 482, 173 Pac. 504.
19481
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
and other variations applied to that particular tort in ordinary cases
are picked up and incorporated, and are applied to the action to the
extent that they are consistent with the language of the statute and
its apparent purpose.1 7 It is a logical conclusion that contributory
negligence is of importance only in those cases in which it would
be available as a defense if the statutory rule were one developed
by the common law.
VIOLATION OF STATUTE AS NEGLIGENCE
By far the greater number of actions based on the violation of a
statute are negligence actions. The reason is the obvious one, that
most statutes are enacted for the protection of the public or of par-
ticular groups or classes of individuals against damage to person
or property, and the conduct which they prohibit is unreasonable
conduct closely related to common law negligence. Normally the
similarity is so clear that there is no reason even to discuss it, and
"safety" statutes are assumed as a matter of course to give rise to
negligence actions.
Negligence is merely a departure from a standard of conduct
required by the law for the protection of others against unreasonable
risk of harm. The standard may be one set by the common law as
the traditional standard of the reasonable man of ordinary prudence;
or it may be laid down by the legislature. When this is done, the
effect of the statute is merely to declare that certain conduct is
required as a standard, from which it is negligence to deviate. When
the common law rule requiring drivers to keep to the right is enacted
as a statute, the rule is not changed in character or quality. A
departure from it is still ordinary negligence, similar in all respects
to a departure from the common law rule.18 Justice Mitchell stated
17. Something like this idea is expressed by Lehman, J., in Tedla v.
Eliman, (1939) 280 N. Y. 124, 19 N. E. (2d) 987, 990: "On the other hand,
where a statutory general rule of cbnduct fixes no definite standard of care
which would under all circumstances tend to protect life, limb or property,
but merely codifies or supplements a common-law rule, which has always
been subject to limitations and exceptions; or where the statutory rule of
conduct regulates conflicting rights and obligations in manner calculated to
promote public convenience and safety, then the statute, in the absence of
clear language to the contrary, should not be construed as intended to wipe
out the limitations and exceptions which judicial decisions have attached
to the common-law duty; nor should it be construed as an inflexible com-
mand that the general rule of conduct intended to prevent accidents must be
followed even under conditions where observance might cause accident."
18. Restatement of Torts (1934), § 285; Lowndes, Civil Liability
Created by Criminal Legislation, (1932) 16 Minn. L. Rev. 361; Morris, The
Relation of Criminal Statutes to Tort Liability, (1933) 46 Harv. L. Rev.
453; Notes, (1935) 19 Minn. L. Rev. 666; (1932) 32 Col. L. Rev. 712; (1928)
13 Corn. L. Q. 634; Prosser, Torts (1941), 264-265.
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this very clearly in the leading Minnesota decision,' 9 in language
which is quoted in the Dart Case:
"Negligence is the breach of legal duty. It is immaterial whether
the duty is one imposed by the rule of common law requiring the
exercise of ordinary care not to injure another, or is imposed by a
statute designed for the protection of others. * * * The only
difference is that in the one case the measure of legal duty is to be
determined upon common law principles, while in the other the
statute fixes it, so that the violation of the statute constitutes con-
clusive evidence of negligence, or in other words, negligence per se.
* * * All that the statute does is to establish a fixed standard by
which the facts of negligence may be determined."
"Negligence per se" as applied to the violation of a statute has
been a source of confusion to generations of law students, to the
bar and even to the courts. It refers to the rule, now accepted in
most states2 including Minnesota,21 that the declaration of the
standard of conduct by the legislature removes it from any deter-
mination by the jury, and that upon proof that the statute is violated
negligence must be found without argument, as a matter of law.
The rule applies to a violation by the plaintiff22 as well as by the
defendant. It has reference only to the proof of negligence, and not
to its effect. "Negligence per se" is not liability per se, and even
though the violation is "conclusive evidence" of negligence and a
peremptory instruction must be given on that issue, there remain
in the case all of the other issues, such as assumption of risk, con-
19. Osborne v. MeMasters, (1889) 40 Minn. 103, 41 N. W. 543, at
page 105.
20. Martin v. Herzog, (1920) 228 N. Y. 164, 126 N. E. 814; Schell v.
Du Bois (1916) 94 Ohio St. 93, 113 N. E. 664; Klatt v. N. C. Foster Lumber
Co., (1867) 97 Wis. 641, 7.3 N. W. 563; Annis v. Britton, (1925) 232 Mich.
291, 205 N. W. 128; Note, (1932) 32 Col. L. Rev. 712.
21. Osborne v. McMasters, (1889) 40 Minn. 103, 41 N. W. 543; Schaar
v. Conforth, (1915) 128 Minn. 460, 151 N. W. 275; Elmgren v. Chicago, M.
& St. P. R. Co., (1907) 102 Minn. 41, 112 N. W. 1067, 12 L. R. A. (N.S.)
754; Sandhofner v. Calmenson, (1927) 170 Minn. 69, 212 N. W. 11; Healy v.
Hoy, (1910) 112 Minn. 138, 127 N. W. 482; Note, (1935) 19 Minn. L.
Rev. 666, 686.
22. Restatement of Torts (1934), § 375; Lloyd v. Pugh, (1941) 158 Wis.
441, 149 N. W. 150; Monroe v. Hartford Street R. Co., (1903) 76 Conn.
201, 56 AtI. 498. Prior to 1931 the Minnesota decisions were in considerable
confusion, and there were a number of cases, such as Dohm v. R. N. Car-
dozo & Brother, (1925) 165 Minn. 193, 206 N. W. 377, holding that a violation
by the plaintiff was merely evidence of negligence. In Mechler v. McMahon,
(1931) 184 Minn. 476, 239 N. W. 605 the court was confronted with violations
by both plaintiff and defendant, each of which raised the issue of both negli-
gence and contributory negligence. It reviewed the decisions, confessed error,
and declared that each violation was negligence as a matter of law in both
respects. This decision has since been followed in Minnesota. See Note, (1935)
19 Minn. L. Rev. 666, 693.
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tributory negligence and proximate cause,2 8 which would remain
if the defendant's conduct had merely been so clearly unreasonable
that the issue must be taken away from the jury at common law. In
short, such "negligence per se" is merely ordinary negligence,
whose existence is established by proof of the violation, but which
once proved does not differ in its legal consequences from negli-
gence at common law.
Friends of the court in the Dart Ca6e contended with consider-
able ingenuity that the violation of a statute is "intentional" mis-
conduct, which should fall under the rule recognized in Minnesota 2'
as elsewhere 25 that contributory negligence is not a defense to an
intentional tort; or at least that it is "wilful" or "wanton" and on
that basis equally not subject to the defense.2 Ignorance of the law
of course excuses no one; and it may even be assumed in the case
of carriers, oil companies and similar defendants, that they do
in fact know the law and are well advised of what it requires them
to do. But the law and their knowledge of it does not alter the
character of their conduct itself, any more than it would be altered
by legal advice as to what the common law requires. If there is
no statute and the defendant intentionally fails to guard his
elevator shaft, his failure is common law negligence. It is not in-
tended to injure anyone, or to invade anyone's rights, and the
defendant is proceeding under an optimistic hope that nothing un-
pleasant will happen. When the legislature lays down the standard
of care by a statute requiring him to guard the shaft, his intentional
failure to do so is still optimistic and intended to injure no one. It
23. Assumption of risk: White v. Cochrane, (1933) 189 Minn. 300, 249
N. W. 328; Le Doux v. Alert Transfer & Storage Co., (1927) 145 Wash.
115, 259 Pac. 24; Knipfer v. Shaw, (1933) 210 Wis. 617, 246 N. W. 328.
Contributory negligence: Browne v. Siegel, Cooper & Co., (1901) 191
Ill. 226, 60 N. E. 815; Keenan v. Edison Electric Illuminating Co., (1893)
159 Mass. 379, 34 N. E. 366; Narramore v. Cleveland, C. C. & St. L. R. Co.,
(C.C.A. 6th 1899) 96 Fed. 298.
Proximate cause: Holman v. Chicago, R. I. & P. R. Co., (1876) 62 Mo.
562; cf. Weeks v. MoNeulty, (1898) 101 Tenn. 495, 48 S. W. 809; Hinton v.
Southern R. Co., (1916) 172 N. C. 587, 90 S. E. 756; Powers v. Standard Oil
Co., (1923) 98 N. J. L. 730, 119 Atl. 273; Sullivan v. Boone, (1939) 205
Minn. 437, 286 N. W. 350.
24. Lambrecht v. Schreyer, (1915) 129 Minn. 271, 152 N. W. 645;
Mueller v. Dewey, (1924) 159 Minn. 173, 198 N. W. 428.
25. Ruter v. Foy, (1877) 46 Iowa 32; Steinmetz v. Kelly, (1880) 72
Ind. 442, 37 Am. Rep. 170; Birmingham Railway, L. & P. Co. v. Jones, (1906)
146 Ala. 277, 41 So. 146; Brendle v. Spencer, (1899) 125 N. C. 474, 34
S. E. 634.
26. Atchison, T. & S. F. R. Co v. Baker, (1908) 79 Kan. 183, 98 Pac.
804; Ziman v. Whitley, (1929) 110 Conn. 108, 147 Atl. 370; Mihelich v.
Butte Electric R. Co., (1929) 85 Mont. 604, 281 Pac. 540; Walldren Express
& Van Co. v. Krug, (1920) 291 Ill. 472, 126 N. E. 97.
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is not suddenly transformed into an "intentional" tort analogous to
assault and battery or deceit.
The intent which will preclude the defense of contributory
negligence is not the intent to do an act, or to do a forbidden act;
it is the intent to do harm to another, or to invade his rights.27
"Wilful" and "wanton," however the terms may have been misused
in Minnesota, 28 both carry the idea of reckless disregard of con-
sequences in the face of a known risk, so great as to make it highly
probable that harm will follow. 29 Driving through traffic at a speed
of eighty miles an hour is certainly "wilful" or "wanton" negli-
gence; but a statute fixing a speed limit of twenty does not supply
the risk and the state of mind, necessary to make "wilful" or
"wanton" the conduct of a man who drives at twenty-five. The
supreme court of Minnesota,30 together with many other courts,"'
has long since rejected the contention that the existence of the
statute adds anything to the quality or character of the act itself.
CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE AS A DEFENSE
Contributory negligence is, then, available as a defense in the
normal action for negligence based on the violation of a statute.
There are few propositions of law better supported by the decisions
27. "The plaintiff's contributory negligence does not bar recovery against
a defendant for a harm caused by conduct of the defendant which is wrongful
because it is intended to cause harm to some legally protected interest of the
plaintiff or a third person." Restatement of Torts (1934), § 481.
28. The Notes in (1924) 8 Minn. L. Rev. 239 and (1939) 24 Minn. L.
Rev. 81 have pointed out at length the fact that, beginning with a misinterpre-
tation of the duty to discovered trespassers in Studley v. St. Paul & Duluth
R. Co., (1892) 48 Minn. 249, 51 N. W. 115, Minnesota has developed its own
doctrine of "wilful" or "wanton" negligence as a substitute for the doctrine
of "discovered peril" found in other states in connection with the last
clear chance. An entirely artificial meaning has been assigned to the
term, that of ordinary negligence or inadvertence after discovery that another
is in danger. This use of the term has been criticized not only in the Notes
cited, but by Jaggard, J., dissenting in Anderson v. Minnesota, St. P. &
S. S. M. R. Co., (1908) 103 Minn. 224, 114 N. W. 1123. The court has
recognized the anomaly of its definition in a case arising in another jurisdic-
tion. Pickering v. Northern Pacific R. Co., (1916) 132 Minn. 205, 156 N. W. 3.
29. Restatement of Torts (1934), § 500, Special Note; Birmingham
Railway & Electric Co. v. Bowers, (1895) 110 Ala. 328, 20 So. 345; Aiken v.
Holyoke Street R. Co,, (1903) 184 Mass, 269, 68 N. E. 238; Thomas v.
Margoni, (1938) 285 Mich. 547, 281 N. W. 321; Biddle i7. Voyd, (Del. Super.
1938) 199 AUt. 479.
30. Judson v. Great Northern R. Co., (1895) 63 Minn. 248, 65 N. W.
447; Olson v. Northern Pacific R. Co., (1901) 84 Minn. 258, 87 N. W. 843.
31. Payne v. Vance, (1921) 103 Ohio St. 59, 133 N. E. 85; Browne v.
Siegel, Cooper & Co., (1901) 191 Ill. 226, 60 N. E. 815; Smith v. Central
of Georgia R. Co., (1910) 165 Ala. 407, 51 So. 792; Gartin v. Meredith,(1899) 153 Ind. 16, 53 N. E. 936; Gipson v. Southern R. Co., (C.C. Ala.
1905) 140 Fed. 410; Brown v. Chicago & N. W. R. Co., (1901) 109 Wis.
384, 85 N. W. 271.
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of Minnesota. The opinion in the Dart Case lists a dozen of them,
dealing with the violation of ordinances regulating the speed of
trains ;32 statutes requiring railway crossing signals83 or the mainte-
nance of crossing gates or flagmen3" or crossings free from ice,
snow or cinders;35 a statute requiring elevator gates to be
guarded, 36 and even a statute requiring a county auditor to
give notice before the sale of land for taxes. 37 There are of course
many hundred more. The example which will readily occur to any-
one is that of the statutes regulating traffic and the condition and
operation of motor vehicles, as to which most lawyers would be
definitely astonished at the suggestion that contributory negligence
is not a defense. And if it be objected that the present Highway
Traffic Act makes a violation only evidence of negligence for the
jury, the answer is that the rule was the same under the former
statutes, the violation of which was held to be negligence as a
matter of law."8
32. The court cites Weyl v. Chicago, M. & St. P. R. Co., (1889) 40
Minn. 350, 42 N. W. 24; Greenwood v. Chicago, R. I. & P. R. Co., (1905) 95
Minn. 284, 104 N. W. 3. A similar decision is Studley v. St. Paul & Duluth
R. Co., (1892) 48 Minn. 249, 51 N. W. 115.
33. The court cites Judson v. Great Northern R. Co., (1895) 63 Minn.
248, 65 N. W. 447; Olson v. Northern Pacific R. Co., (1901) 84 Minn.
258, 87 N. W. 843; Carnegie v. Great Northern R. Co., (1914) 128 Minn.
14, 150 N. W. 164; Capretz v. Chicago Great Western R. Co., (1923) 157
Minn. 29, 195 N. W. 531; Munson v. Minneapolis, St. P. & S. S. M. R. Co.,
(1924) 170 Minn. 513, 212 N. W. 946; Franklin v. Minneapolis, St. P. &
S. S. M. R. Co., (1930) 179 Minn. 480, 229 N. W. 797. Similar decisions are
Howe v. Minneapolis, St. P. & S. S. M. R. Co., (1895) 62 Minn. 71, 64
N. W. 102; Buran v. Great Northern R. Co., (1897) 67 Minn. 434, 69 N. W.
1149; Nelson v. St. Paul & Duluth R. Co., (1899) 76 Minn. 189, 78 N. W.
1041, 79 N. W. 530; Sandberg v. St. Paul & Duluth R. Co., (1900) 80 Minn.
442, 83 N. W. 411; Schmitt v. Great Northern R. Co., (1901) 83 Minn.
105, 85 N. W. 935; Carlson v. Chicago & N. W. R. Co., (1905) 96 Minn.
504, 105 N. W. 555; Pogue v. Great Northern R. Co., (1914) 127 Minn. 79,
148 N. W. 889; Wesler v. Chicago, St. P. M. & 0. R. Co., (1919) 143 Minn.
159, 173 N. W. 865; Anderson v. Great Northern R. Co (1920) 147 Minn.
118, 179 N. W. 687; Engstrom v. Canadian Northern R. Co., (1922) 153
Minn. 146, 189 N. W. 580, 190 N. W. 68; Molden v. Minneapolis, St. P. &
S. S. M. R. Co., (1924) 160 Minn. 471, 200 N. W. 740; Bailey v. Minneapolis,
St. P. & S. S. M. R. Co., (1926) 166 Minn. 118, 207 N. W. 26; Jones v. Great
Northern R. Co., (1929) 178 Minn. 322, 227 N. W. 45.
34. Schneider v. Northern Pacific R. Co., (1900) 81 Minn. 383, 84
N. W. 124.
35. Akerson v..Great Northern R. Co., (1924) 158 Minn. 369, 197
N. W. 842.
36. The court cites Schutt v. Adair, (1906) 99 Minn. 7, 108 N. W. 811.
A similar decision is Security Trust Co. v. St. Paul Building Co., (1911) 116
Minn. 295, 133 N. W. 861.
37. Foster v. Malberg; (1912) 119 Minn. 168, 137 N. W. 816.
38. Sorenson v. Sanderson, (1929) 176 Minn. 299, 233 N. W. 145 (right
of way) ; Rosenau v. Peterson, (1920) 147 Minn. 95, 179 N. W. 647 (right
of way); Syck v. Duluth Street R. Co., (1920) 146 Minn. 118, 177 N. W.
944 (right of way); Ward v. Bangel, (1930) 181 Minn. 32, 231 N. W. 244
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It would be reasonable to conclude that the availability of the
defense in the normal case is as well settled in Minnesota as any
rule of law can be, and that any change overruling so many decisions
must necessarily be a matter for the legislature. In two compara-
tively recent cases, however, the court has unexpectedly stated
in broad terms that contributory negligence is never a defense where
the action is founded upon an "intentional violation of a statute."
Counsel in the Dart Case made use of these decisions as a spring-
board for a frontal attack upon the entire doctrine.
The first of the two was Hanson v. HallJ3 in 1938. In the course
of a labor dispute a group of strikers blocked the public highway
with a truck, and the plaintiff negligently drove into it. The court,
after declaring4 0 that the obstruction was a public nuisance and an
intentional invasion of the plaintiff's right to use the highway, pro-
ceeded to say :,"
"Where an action is based on an unintentional invasion of an-
other's right, the contributory negligence of plaintiff is a proper
off-set to defendants' liability. * * * But where the action is based
on an invasion which is both intentional and criminal, the mere
negligence of the person whose rights are invaded is no adequate
defense."
This was followed, in 1944, by Flaherty v. Great Northern Rail-
way Co.42 The defendant, in violation of a statute43 making such
conduct a misdemeanor, blocked a public street with its train for
more than ten minutes, and the plaintiff negligently drove into the
side of a standing freight car. The court again stated that the
obstruction was an invasion of the plaintiff's rights, and said :-,
"The defense of plaintiffs' contributory negligence was not open
to defendant. Where injury is sustained as the result of intentional
obstruction of a highway in violation of the statute, the contributory
negligence of the person injured is no defense. Hanson z. Hall, 202
Minn. 381, 279 N. W. 227, supra. The evidence here conclusively
shows that plaintiffs' injuries were sustained as the result of the
defendant's intentionally obstructing the street with the train or the
freight car, as the case might be, in violation of statute.
"It is only where defendant's acts constitute an intentional
violation of statute that the defense of contributory negligence is
not open to him. Hanson v. Hall, supra."
(parking without lights) ; Elvidge v. Strong & Warner Co., (1921) 148 Minn.
184, 181 N. W. 346 (keeping to right in turning a corner).
39. (1938) 202 Minn. 381, 279 N. W. 227.
40. At 202 Minn. 385.
41. At 202 Minn. 385-386.
42. (1944) 218 Minn. 488, 16 N. W. (2d) 553.
43. Minn. Stats. 1941, § 616.31.
44. At 218 Minn. 494-495.
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The court then proceeded to distinguish the statute regulating
traffic on the ground that it specifically provides that a violation
shall be only prima facie evidence of negligence, "with the con-
sequence that contributory negligence is not a defense in actions
based on a violation thereof." 45
It is at once apparent that both of these cases lie in the field of
public nuisance, and that the statutes violated were nuisance
statutes. This is expressly recognized in Hanson v. Hall, and the
Flaherty decision does no more than follow the earlier case. The
opinion in the Dart Case distinguishes both as nuisance cases,"6
and so lays at rest any idea that they represent a new doctrine and a
departure from the established rule.
This is perhaps not enough. It is now generally recognized47
that "nuisance" is a type of injury rather than a separate kind of
conduct, and that either a public or a private nuisance may be
created by acts which are intentional in the sense that they are
intended to invade the rights of another, or merely negligent be-
cause they involve a foreseeable risk of such invasion, or not even
negligent but so far extra-hazardous or anti-social as to give rise
to strict liability or "liability without fault" of the kind which is
forever associated with the name of Rylands v. Fletcher."8 It is
equally well recognized that where the conduct which creates a
nuisance is mere negligence, the defense of contributory negli-
gence is open ;49 and this is true of a public5" as well as a private
45. At 218 Minn. 495.
46. "The principal distinction between the case before us and the Hanson
and Flaherty cases is that in both of the latter cases the statute involved
provided that a violation of it constituted a public nuisance. Minn. St. 1945 and
.M. S. A. 616.01. In those cases the court determined that the negligent acts
constituted a nuisance and were'wilful and intentional. * * *
"The decisions in these cases were confined to the situations involved in
each particular case. The court did not hold in either case that contributory
negligence is not a defense to even wilful negligence in all cases, but merely
dtermined that contributory negligence was not available as a defense where
the wilful negligence constituted a nuisance." Dart v. Pure Oil Co., (Minn.
1947) 27 N. W. (2d) 555, at 562.
47. Notes, (1935) 28 Ill. L. Rev. 372; (1935) 23 Cal. L. Rev. 427;
(1935) 19 Minn. L. Rev. 249; (1937) 35 Mich. L. Rev. 684; (1940) 26
Corn. L. Q. 163; (1940) 38 Mich. L. Rev. 1337; (1940) 17
N. Y. U. L. Q. Rev. 302; Prosser, Torts (1941), 597-598.
48. (1866) L. R. 1 Ex. 265, aff'd (1868) L. R. 3 H. L. 330.
49. Crommelin v. Coxe & Co., (1857) 30 Ala. 318, 68 Am. Dec. 120;
Smith v. Smith, (1824) 2 Pick. (Mass.) 621, 13 Am. Dec. 464; Irwin v.
Sprigg, (1847) 6 Gill (Md.) 200, 46 Am. Dec. 667; Niagara Oil Co. v. Ogle,(1911) 177 Ind. 292, 98 N. E. 60; Rischer v. Acken Coal Co., (1910) 147
Iowa 459, 124 N. W. 764; Higginbotham v. Kearse, (1931) 111 W. Va. 264,
161 S. E. 37.
50. McFarlane v. City of Niagara Falls, (1928) 247 N. Y. 340, 160
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nuisance. As a matter of fact the earliest case51 in English or
American law in which contributory negligence was recognized as a
defense involved the obstruction of the public highway. There is
thus no magic in the word "nuisance" which disposes of the issue;
it is on the contrary a mere invitation to inquire further into the
nature of the defendant's conduct.
In both the Hanson and the Flaherty cases, however, the
nuisance was intentionally created. In Hanson v. Hall the blockade
of the highway was directed at the plaintiff and intended to prevent
his passage; and in the Flaherty Case the court refers throughout
to "intentional" obstruction, and leaves no doubt that it considers
that the defendant consciously and deliberately exceeded the ten
minutes permitted by the statute. The railway intentionally invaded
the right, which the plaintiff shared with the rest of the public, to
use the highway; and when harm resulted from such an invasion,
it could not be heard to say that the plaintiff should have exercised
more care. The question is left open whether contributory negli-
gence could be set up if it were found that through mere mistake,
inadvertence or failure to take account of time the railway company
had left its train standing for eleven minutes instead of ten; and
when the case arises the answer may quite possibly be yes.
It is difficult to feel entirely happy about the Flaherty Case.
Apart from some confusion as to "intentional violation," it is not
clear that the statute properly had anything to do with the case
at all. In other jurisdictions it is quite generally held that a statute
limiting the time during which a railway train may block a crossing
is intended only to prevent delays of traffic and may give rise to an
action for such delay,52 but is not intended to protect anyone against
personal injury from running into the train. Such injuries are held
not to be within the risk at which the statute is directed,5 3 and it
N. E. 391, 57 A. L. R. 1; Delaney v. Philhern Realty Holding Corp., (1939)
280 N. Y. 461, 21 N. E. (2d) 507; Hill v. Way, (1931) 117 Conn. 359, 168
AtI. 1; Mayor of Baltimore v. Marriott, (1850) 9 Md. 160, 66 Am. Dec. 326;
City of Lebanon v. Twiford, (1895) 13 Ind. App. 384, 41 N. E. 844; Town
of Gilmer v. Pickett, (Tex. Civ. App. 1921) 228 S. W. 347.
51. Butterfield v. Forrester, (1809) 11 East 60, 103 Eng. Rep. 926.
52. Patterson v. Detroit, L. & N. R. Co., (1885) 56 Mich. 172, 22
N. W. 260.
53. Cf. Restatement of Torts, § 286 (c) ; Crosby v. Great Northern R.
Co., (1932) 187 Minn, 263, 245 N. W. 31; Westlund v. Iverson, (1922) 154
Minn. 52, 191 N. W. 253; Gorris v. Scott, (1874) L. R. 9 Ex. 125; Robert-
son v. Yazoo & M. V. R. Co., (1929) 154 Miss. 182, 122 So. 371; Ingalsbe v.
St. Louis-San Francisco R. Co., (1922) 295 Mo. 177, 243 S. W. 323; Larri-
more v. American Nat. Ins. Co., (1939) 184 Okla. 614, 89 P. (2d) 340.
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affords no basis for an action for them.5 4 The common sense of this
position lies in the obvious fact that it is pure fortuitous accident
that the particular driver arrives at the fifteenth minute instead of
the fifth, and that the length of time does nothing to increase the
likelihood that any one individual will run into the train. But
with the statute removed from the case after ten minutes, the
obstruction of the highway becomes a public nuisance at common
law, and this in turn has been overlooked by the other courts.
It is also difficult to justify the distinction made in the Flaherty
Case by which a violation which by provision of the statute itself
is merely evidence of negligence, as in the Minnesota Highway
Traffic Act, is treated as subject to the defense of contributory
negligence, while a violation which is "negligence per se" is not. The
difference is only one of proof; and whether the negligence is
found as a fact by the jury or is found as a matter of law by the
court, no reason is apparent for any difference in its effect. There
is no authority outside of the Flaherty Case to support such a
distinction.
THE EXCEPTIONAL STATUTES
There remain for consideration a group of unusual and ex-
ceptional statutes in which, although the action is founded on
negligence, the court has found a legislative intent to remove the
defense of contributory negligence. Such statutes are treated as
analogous to those fixing the age of consent to intercourse.55 They
are construed to place the entire responsibility upon the defendant,
and to require him to protect not only plaintiffs who are exercising
reasonable care but those who are contributorily negligent as well.
In such cases an intent always is attributed to the legislature.
54. Fox v. Illinois Central R. Co., (1941) 308 Ill. App. 367, 31 N. E.
(2d) 805; Megan v. Stevens, (C.C.A. 8th 1937) 91 F. (2d) 419; Denton v.
Missouri, K. & T. R. Co., (1913) 90 Kan. 51, 133 Pac. 558; Fountain v.
Houston, E. & W. T. R. Co., (Tex. Civ. App. 1927) 298 S. W. 630; Webb v.
Oregon-Washington R. R., (1938) 195 Wash. 155, 80 P. (2d) 409; Pennsyl-
vania R. Co. v. Huss, (1932) 96 Ind. App. 71, 180 N. E. 919; Jones v.
Atchison, T. & S. F. R. Co., (1929) 129 Kan. 350, 282 Pac. 593.
In many cases the decision has been on the ground that the violation of
the statute is not the "proximate cause" of the injury. Hendley v. Chicago &
N. W. R. Co., (1929) 198 Wis. 569, 225 N. W. 205; Gilman v. Central Vt.
R. Co., (1919) 93 Vt. 340, 107 Atl. 122; Simpson v. Pere Marquette R. Co.,
(1926) 276 Mich. 653, 268 N. W. 769.
55. Cf. Gaither v. Meacham, (1926) 214 Ala 343, 108 So. 2; Bishop v.
Liston, (1924) 112 Neb. 559, 199 N. W. 825; Hough v. Iderhoff, (1914) 69
Or. 568, Pac. 931; Glover v. Callahan, (1937) 299 Mass. 55, 12 N. E. (2d)
194; Restatement of Torts, § 61. And see Restatement of Torts, § 483, Com-
ment d.
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Sometimes, as in the Federal Employers' Liability Act,58 the
statute contains express language leaving no doubt. Sometimes a
clue to the intent is found in some provision of the statute, as in
the Minnesota case of Mayes v. Byers,57 where the act required a
saloon-keeper to.post a penal bond and gave the injured plaintiff an
action on the bond. More commonly the statute itself is silent, and
the legislative intent is found from its character and obvious pur-
pose, and from the background of the social problem and the par-
ticular hazard at which it is directed. Courts are no more ignorant
than ordinary mortals of what is going on in the world and why
laws are passed; and while they do not call it judicial notice, they
apply this knowledge in determining what result the legislature is
seeking to accomplish. In this sense it always has been and always
will be true that "Th' Supreme Coort follows th' iliction returns."58
The typical cases are those of the child labor acts. These are
found to be intended to place all responsibility upon the employer,
so that he is liable for injury to the child even though he has acted
in good faith and has employed the infant in ignorance of his age.5 9
To this extent they impose strict or absolute liability. In Minne-
sota 0 as elsewhere,61 it has been held that the evident purpose of the
statute would be defeated if the employer were permitted to set up
the contributory negligence of the child, and that the legislature
must be taken to have intended that no such defense should be
56. 35 Stat. 65 (1908 ) 45 U. S. C. § 51 et seq. (1940). The act provides
that contributory negligence is not a complete defense but goes only to reduce
the damages.
57. (1943) 214 Minn. 54, 7 N. W. (2d) 403. See infra, note 63.
58. Finley Peter Dunne, Mr. Dooley's Opinions (1906), 26.
59. Beauchamp v. Sturges & Burns Mfg. Co., (1911) 250 Ill. 303, 95
N. E. 204; Krutlies v. Bulls Head Coad Co., (1915) 249 Pa. 162, 94 Atl. 459,
L. R. A. 1915F 1082; Blanton v. Kellioka Coal Co., (1921) 192 Ky. 220, 232
S. W. 614; Dusha v. Virginia & Rainy Lake Co., (1920) 145 Minn. 171, 176
N. W. 482; Restatement of Torts, § 286, Comment d; (1930 39 Yale L. J. 908.
60. "The purpose of the statute is to protect children in life and limb, by
prohibiting their employment in dangerous occupation where, because of their
immaturity, they are likely inappreciative of risks and prone to be careless
and heedless. So the statute altogether prohibits their employment and makes
it a misdemeanor. A very great weight of authority establishes the doctrine
that an employer who violates such a statute cannot assert contributory
negligence nor the assumption of risks as a defense." Dusha v. Virginia &
Rainy Lake Co., (1920) 145 Minn. 171, 172, 176 N. W. 482. Accord, Weber
v. J. E. Barr Packing Corp., (1931) 182 Minn. 486, 234 N. W. 682.
61. Lenahan v. Pittston Coal Mining Co., (1907) 218 Pa. 311, 67 Atl.
642; Marino v. Lehmaier, (1903) 173 N. Y. 530, 66 N. E. 572; Pinoza v.
Northern Chair Co., (1913) 152 Wis. 473, 140 N. W. 84; Karpeles v. Heine,(1919) 227 N. Y. 74, 124 N. E. 101; Louisville, N. & St. L. R. Co. v. Lyons,
(1913) 155 Ky. 396, 159 S. W. 971; Terry Dairy Co. v. Nalley, (1920) 146
Ark. 448, 225 S. W. 887; American Car & Foundry Co. v. Armentraut,(1905) 214 Ill. 509, 73 N. E. 766.
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available. Statutes prohibiting the sale of firearms and similar
dangerous articles to minors62 are held, for obvious reasons, to
stand on the same footing, as are acts requiring precautions for
the protection of intoxicated 3 or unusually ignorant 4 people.
It is such decisions that have led the Restatement of Torts5 to
state the principle as follows:
"If the defendant's negligence consists in the violation of a
statute intended to protect a class of persons from their inability to
exercise self-protective care, a member of such class is not barred
by his contributory negligence from recovery for bodily harm caused
by the violation of such statute."
This statement is perhaps a bit too narrow. It may be suggested
that "inability to exercise self-protective care" is not necessarily
the sole criterion by which an intent to abrogate the defense can be
determined. In other jurisdictions statutes requiring railways to
fence their tracks for the protection of livestock 0 or making them
62. Pizzo v. Wiemann, (1912) 149 Wis. 235, 134 N. W. 899; McMillen
v. Steele, (1923) 275 Pa. 584, 119 At. 721. In the latter case it was held that
while the negligence of the minor himself would be no defense, the defendant
could set up the contributory negligence of an injured adult. This clearly indi-
cates the policy found in the statute.
63. Davies v. McKnight, (1892) 146 Pa. 610, 23 At. 320; Hauth v.
Sambo, (1916) 100 Neb. 160, 158 N. W. 1036.
In Mayes v. Byers, (1943) 214 Minn. 54, 7 N. W. (2d) 403, an ordinance
requiring stairways in "on sale" liquor establishments to be well lighted was
construed as intended to impose strict responsibility upon the owners for the
protection of intoxicated persons, so that their contributory negligence was
not a defense. The court cited the Restatement of Torts, § 483 as stating
"the general principle of law applied in these cases," and said:
"* * * The legislation and ordinance here considered manifest a recog-
nition that strict regulation and control are needed for the safety and welfare
of patrons who frequent the premises of 'on sale' liquor dealers and that, with
their minds and judgment often affected by the excessive use of intoxicants,
they cannot be left to their own self-protection. * * * Responsibility for the
safety of such persons is placed squarely upon the proprietor of the business-
the man to whom the profits of the business go. To insure that responsibility,
a bond is required to be made expressly for the benefit of those injured. If
these very same people should now be denied the right of recovery in cases
where contributory negligence or intoxication could be shown, the very
object of this legislation would be substantially defeated."
64. In Bennett Drug Stores v. Mosely, (1942) 69 Ga. App. 347, 20 S. E.(2d) 208, the court had before it a statute providing that no poison should
be sold unless upon due inquiry it should be found that the purchaser knew its
character. The court cited the Restatement, found a legislative intent to
protect ignorant purchasers against their own inability to protect themselves,
and held that contributory negligence was no defense.
65. Restatement of Torts (1934), § 483. In Comment b the child labor
acts are given as the only illustration.
66. Flint & Pere Marquette R. Co. v. Lull, (1874) 28 Mich. 510; Cong-
don v. Central Vt. R. Co., (1883) 56 Vt. 390, 48 Am. Rep. 793; Welty v.
Indianapolis & V. R. Co., (1886) 105 Ind. 410, 4 N. E. 410; Atchison, T. &
S. F. R. Co. v. Paxton, (1907) 75 Kan. 197, 88 Pac. 1082; Quackenbush v.
Wisconsin & M. R. Co., (1888) 71 Wis. 472, 37 N. W. 834.
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liable for fires 7 are held quite consistently to make the defendant
fully responsible and to relieve the plaintiff of the defense of con-
tributory negligence. Minnesota, so far as can be discovered, stands
quite alone in permitting the defense as to both types of statute."8
It can scarcely be pretended, in any particular instance, that the
plaintiff is incapable of doing whatever a reasonable man would
do to keep his cattle off of the track or to prevent the fire from
spreading to his barn. The intent to eliminate the defense is found
rather from the fact, which the court knows as well as anyone else,
that such statutes are passed for the very purpose of relieving ad-
joining landowners of the onerous burden of taking precautions, and
of requiring the railway company to pay its way by assuming the
burden or be liable for the damage resulting from its failure to
comply.
In Minnesota, as in many other states, it was formerly held69
that factory acts and similar regulations requiring employers to
guard dangerous machinery or to take other steps for the safety
of workmen were no exception to the general rule, and were subject
to the defense of contributory negligence. A change in social view-
point and in the attitude of both courts and legislatures toward
labor, too familiar to call for any expatiation, has induced a strong
and increasing minority of the courts"0 to reconsider their earlier
decisions, and to hold that such statutes place full responsibility
upon the employer, and that their whole purpose and intent would
be defeated and nullified if contributory negligence were to be
available as a defense. Stress has been laid upon the fact that the
employee, because of economic necessity, is not free either to choose
his employment or to leave it; upon the impossibility of his being
67. West v. Chicago & N. W. R. Co., (1887) 77 Iowa 654, 35 N. W.
479; Bowen v. Boston & A. R. Co., (1901) 179 Mass. 524, 61 N. E. 141;
Matthews v. Missouri Pac. R. Co., (1897) 142 Mo. 645, 44 S. W. 802; Peter
v. Chicago & N. W. R. Co., (1899) 121 Mich. 324, 80 N. W. 295.
68. In three early decisions the Minnesota court held that contributory
negligence was a defense to the violation of a fencing statute. Whittier v.
Chicago, M. & St. P. R. Co., (1878) 24 Minn. 394; Johnson v. Chicago, M. &
St. P. R. Co., (1882) 29 Minn. 425, 13 N. W. 673; Moser v. St. Paul & Duluth
R. Co., (1890) 42 Minn. 480, 44 N. W. 530. In L. R. Martin Lbr. Co. v.
Great Northern R. Co., (1913) 123 Minn. 423, 144 N. W. 145, it was held
without discussion that it was a defense to the violation of a fire statute.
69. Anderson v. C. N. Nelson Lumber Co., (1896) 67 Minn. 79, 69
N. W. 630 heads a series of decisions which are overr-uled, and many of them
listed, in Suess v. Arrowhead Steel Products Co., (1930) 180 Minn. 21,
230 N. W. 125.
70. Osborne v. Salvation Army, (C.C.A. 2d 1939) 107 F. (2d) 929;
Carterville Coal Co. v. Abbott, (1899) 181 111. 495, 55 N. E. 131; Casper v.
Lewin, (1910) 82 Kan. 604, 109 Pac. 657; Chicago-Coulterville Coal Co. v.
Fidelity & Cas. Co., (W.D. Mo. 1904) 130 Fed. 957.
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constantly and forever on the alert for dangers; and upon the social
policy, expressed in the workmen's compensation acts, that "the
cost of the product shall bear the blood of the workman." While
this is no doubt "inability to exercise self-protective care" in the
broadest sense, it certainly differs from the inability of the child,
and the decisions find the "intent" of the statute rather from its
background of social policy than from any anticipated incapacity
of the plaintiff for care in any particular instance. In Suess v.
Arrowhead Steel Products Co.7 1 the Minnesota court, on the basis
of nothing more than "the public policy of the state, as gathered
from legislation enacted during the last 20 years and more," over-
ruled a long line of earlier decisions and held that assumption of
risk is not a defense where such a statute is violated. While the
question of contributory negligence has not arisen, the language
of the decision7 2 leaves no room for doubt that that defense too is
now removed.
The statute in which such an intent is to be discovered is defi-
nitely the exception rather than the rule. The writer has found
only those mentioned. When we come to ordinary public safety
regulations, such as the petroleum statute violated in the Dart Case,
the special considerations and the background of policy which are
found in the child labor acts and the other statutes are lacking.
It is not enough to say that the regulation is intended for the protec-
tion of purchasers. Traffic statutes are intended for the protection
of other drivers and pedestrians; railway crossing statutes are
intended for the protection of those who are to cross; every safety
statute is intended for the protection of somebody. Something more
is needed. Such petroleum regulations have been held quite con-
sistently to impose no absolute responsibility, and contributory
negligence has been held to be a defense.73 A diligent search for
71. (1930) 180 Minn. 21, 230 N. W. 125.
72. "The public policy of the state, as gathered from legislation enacted
during the last 20 years and more, is to make the employer liable for injury
to an employee caused by the violation by the employer of a statute requiring
him to provide and maintain safe premises and appliances for the protection
of his employees, and that the defense of assumption of risk should not
apply in such cases." Suess v. Arrowhead Steel Products Co., (1930) 180
Minn. 21, 25, 230 N. W. 125.
73. Morrison v. Lee, (1911) 22 N. D. 251, 133 N. W. 548; Gulf Re-
fining Co. v. Jinright, (C.C.A. 5th 1925) 10 F. (2d) 306; Peterson v. Standard
Oil Co., (1910) 55 Or. 511, 106 Pac. 337; Parton v. Phillips Petroleum Co.,
(1937) 231 Mo. App. 585, 107 S. W. (2d) 167; Gibson Oil Co. v. Bush,
(1928) 175 Ark. 944, 1 S. W. (2d) 88; Olena v. Standard Oil Co., (1926)
82 N. H. 408, 135 Atl. 27.
Under the Minnesota statute the question had been left open in Farrell
v. 0. G. Miller Co., (1920) 147 Minn. 52, 179 N. W. 566, and was not con-
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any decisions holding that because of the highly dangerous char-
acter of explosive petroleum mixtures a special policy is to be dis-
coyered placing sole responsibility upon the dealer, has produced
only one Wisconsin case7 4 declaring the violation to be "gross negli-
gence."
The consumers of kerosene are not normally children; they
are not intoxicated; they are not employees compelled by economic
necessity to work in a place of danger; they are no more ignorant,
and no more unable to protect themselves than ordinary mem-
bers of the community. A rather close analogy is suggested to the
pure food acts in various states, which obviously are intended for
the protection of purchasers no more able to protect themselves
than purchasers of petroleum. It has consistently been held75 that
contributory negligence is a defense to their violation. Furthermore,
as the opinion in the Dart Case points out,78 the duty imposed by
the petroleum statute is not limited to consumers, and might give
rise to an dction by any passing member of the public injured by an
explosion in a filling station.
THE EVIDENCE
Dart v. Pure Oil Co. is to be tried again. It would be entirely
improper to express here any opinion on the facts which might be
regarded as intended to influence the decision. This is particularly
truewhere the second trial may add new evidence or throw a differ-
ent light on the testimony in the first. The writer must emphatically
disclaim any such intention. However, the evidence as to the facts
sidered in Getz v. Standard Oil Co., (1926) 168 Minn. 347, 210 N. W. 78;
but in Riggs v. Standard Oil Co., (C.C. Minn. 1904) 130 Fed. 199, the federal
court clearly held that contributory negligence was a defense.
74. Knecht v. Kenyon, (1923) 179 Wis. 523, 192 N. W. 82.
75. Friedman v. Beck, (1937) 250 App. Div. 87, 293 N. Y. S. 649;
Kelley v. John R. Daily Co., (1919) 56 Mont. 63, 181 Pac. 326; Kurth v.
Krumme, (1944) 143 Ohio St. 638, 56 N. E. (2d) 227; Tate v. Mauldin,
(1930) 157 S. C. 392, 154 S. E. 431. The Minnesota court has held that the
pure food act permits the defense of contributory negligence on the part of
a dealer. Neiman v. Channellene Oil & Mfg. Co., (1910) 112 Minn. 11, 127
N. W. 394.
76. "We can visualize many instances where a violation of the statute
might affect the rights of the general public even though the injured person
was not at the time a user of the product. For example, if a pedestrian was
passing an oil station, even though he was not at the time a purchaser or
user of volatile oils, and an explosion occurred at the oil station as the result
of a violation of the statute in connection with the negligent handling of
kerosene or gasoline, can it be said that the statute was not for his protec-
tion as a member of the general public as well as for one who was actually
buying or using the product at the time of the explosion? We think not."
Dart v. Pure Oil Co., (Minn. 1947) 27 N. W. (2d) 555, 562-563.
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of contributory negligence brought before the supreme court
presents rather an interesting question; and since it is a matter
of public record and has served as a battlefield for a considerable
number of attorneys, it is not improper to review it.
The decedent Dart lived in a small cabin north of Hibbing. The
cabin was heated by a small stove. Some time before his death he
had bought the can of "kerosene," and there was no evidence that
he ever knew or suspected that it was anything else. On the day of
the accident, October 16, 1943, two employees of a lumber company
drove up to the cabin about 8:30 in the morning to deliver some
lumber and briquets. As they approached they saw that there was
no smoke in the chimney. The decedent came out in his night
clothes and gave them some instructions. Shortly afterwards he
came out again to get some of the briquets. He said that he was
having a hard time getting his fire started; that he had only green
popple wood; that "it was pretty hard to start," and that maybe
the coal would help to get it going. It might be inferred that he had
just then started the fire. He reentered the cabin. After a lapse of time
variously estimated at five, seven of ten minutes,77 the visitors heard
a muffled explosion and a scream. When they rushed into the cabin
they found the decedent covered with the contents of the petroleum
can and in flames. They got him outside, extinguished the flames
by rolling him in the sand, and hurried him to a hospital, where he
died.
Subsequently the cabin was examined by four witnesses. They
found the stove door open. Tilted into it was the kerosene can, with
its bottom blown out. The indications were quite definite that the
explosion had occurred while Dart was pouring the liquid from the
can into the stove, and that it occurred inside of the can itself.
There was expert testimony that a flame or spark could ignite
gasoline vapor and follow it back into the can.
There was no fire in the stove. The fuel was laid, with green
popple wood underneath and briquets on top. It was not disar-
ranged.78 The wood was not charred.79 It "had a little black smoke
on it,"' 0 or "some black marks like smoke,""' but it did not appear
to have been burned.8 ' Two witnesses testified that it looked "as
77. Record, 170, 171, 191, 215.
78. Record, 545, 754.
79. Record, 209, 790.
80. Record, 543, 790.
81. Record, 551-552.
82. Record, 543, 551-552.
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though there had not been any fire on the wood," 88 and "it had not
gone that far."
' 4
What actually happened in that cabin no one will ever know. But
on this circumstanstial evidence, with nothing more in the record,
it was contended on behalf of plaintiff that the jury might reason-
ably conclude that the fire had not burned steadily and continuously
during the ten, seven or even five minutes which had elapsed since
it was started. It was argued that even green wood, burning for that
length of time, could be expected to show more than "a little black
smoke," particularly after an explosion. It was contended that the
jury might conclude that Dart had seen no fire, embers or spark,
and that he had reasonably believed that he was pouring kerosene
onto an extinct fire.
On the way to the hospital the decedent said that "he had heard
of that happening to other people but he never thought he would
fall for such a game."8 At the hospital he told the doctor that "he
poured some kerosene into the fire of a stove and the explo-
sion resulted." 86 It was contended that both of these state-
ments were ambiguous, so far as they might indicate Dart's knowl-
edge that the fire was not out, and that the jury might understand
them to mean merely that he knew retrospectively that there was an
active fire in the the stove, not that he had known it at the time.
Our ancestors and our rural contemporaries have made a great
deal of law on the general subject of lighting fires with kerosene.
One gathers the impression that they have blown themselves up
with monotonous regularity. It is uniformly held, in recognition
of the survival of several generations who have done it, that it is
not negligence as a matter of law to pour kerosene on dead fuel
and apply a match to it.87 On the other hand the dangerous character
of the liquid is a matter of such common knowledge that no ordinary
man can be permitted to claim ignorance of it,88 and except for two
83. Record, 544, 551-552.
84. Record, 551-552.
85. Record, 202-203, 221-222.
86. Record, 768.
87. Peplinske v. Kleinke, (1941) 299 Mich. 86, 299 N. W. 818; Pierce
Oil Co. v. Taylor, (C.C.A. 8th 1920) 264 Fed. 829; Peterson v. Standard Oil
Co., (1910) 55 Or. 511, 106 Pac. 337; Fairbanks, Morse & Co. v. Gambill,(1920) 142 Tenn. 6, 222 S. W. 5; Waters-Pierce Oil Co. v. Deselms, (1909)
212 U. S. 159; Farrell v. 0. G. Miller Co., (1920) 147 Minn. 52, 179 N. W.
566.
88. Riggs v. Standard Oil Co., (C.C. Minn. 1904) 130 Fed. 199; Mor-
rison v. Lee, (1907) 16 N. D. 377, 113 N. W. 1025, 13 L. R. A. (N.S.) 650;
Goode v. Pierce Oil Corp., (1926) 171 Ark. 863, 286 S. W. 1009; Parton v.
Phillips Petroleum Co., (1937) 231 Mo. App. 585, 107 S. W. (2d) 167; see
Jennings v. Standard Oil Co., (1934) 206 N. C. 261, 173 S. E. 582.
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decisions8" the courts have held consistently that it is negligence as
a matter of law to pour kerosene on live coals or a visible flame.90
Stress is always laid on the plaintiff's knowledge or reason to be-
lieve that there was an active fire; and where such knowledge or
reason is lacking it has been held to be error to give a peremptory
instruction."
There is an interesting Louisiana decision 92 in which the plain-
tiff's daughter lighted a fire in a heater in his bedroom, and went
back to bed. Some thirty minutes later the plaintiff went to the
heater, found that it was not giving off heat, opened it and satisfied
himself that the fire had gone out. He then poured onto the wood
about half a pint of what he believed to be kerosene, and was in-
jured by the ensuing explosion. The court held that he was not
required as a matter of law to take the wood out of the stove to
make sure that the fire was extinct, and that the jury might properly
find that he has used reasonable care.9 3 In the Dart Case it was con-
tended that one entirely possible explanation of the accident was
that the decedent had done the same thing.
The supreme court, in reversing the directed verdict, said very
89. In Douglas v. Daniels Bros. Coal Co., (1939) 135 Ohio St. 641,
22 N. E. (2d) 195, and Dronette v. Meaux Bros., (1924) 156 La. 239, 100
So. 411, the question was held to be one for the jury.
90. Riggs v. Standard Oil Co., (C.C. Minn. 1904) 130 Fed. 199; Parton
v. Phillips Petroleum Co., (1937) 231 Mo. App. 585, 107 S. W. (24) 167;
Goode v. Pierce Oil Corp., (1926) 171 Ark. 863, 286 S. W. 1009; Crouch v.
Noland, (1931) 238 Ky. 575, 38 S. W. (2d) 471; Olena v. Standard Oil Co.,
(1926) 82 N. H. 408, 135 Atl. 27.
91. "On the other hand, even if there were evidence to show that the
explosion was caused because the inflammable liquid was poured either upon
fire or embers, the request ignores the element that the fire or embers in the
stove were apparent to the decedent, Lawrence E. Clarke, upon the exercise
of ordinary care. In other words, it would not be negligence to pour gasoline
or kerosene into a stove in which there was a fire burning, or in which there
were live coals or embers, unless the party doing it knew of such fire or
embers or could have known thereof by the exercise of ordinary care. The
Court did not err in refusing the request." Paragon Refining Co. v. Higbea,
(1925) 22 Ohio App. 440, 153 N. E. 860.
92. Frazier v. Ayres, (La. App. 1945) 20 So. (2d) 754.
93. "We think that Frazier was not called upon to do more than he did
to determine if there was any fire in the stove prior to pouring the liquid
therein. He observed that the pine splinters had burned and that the wood
nearest the door was charred. He saw no evidence of fire either from the
front or through the opening at the top. The stove was not giving off heat. He
could have done but one thing more. He could have removed the wood from
the stove. Few persons, if any, who understand the nature of kerosene would
have done this prior to pouring kerosene on the wood. They would have felt
perfectly safe in not doing so. It did not reflect lack of due care for Frazier
to do no more than he did." Frazier v. Ayres, (La. App. 1925) 20 So. (2d)
754, 761.
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little about the merits of the case,94 but evidently felt that the jury
should be permitted to hear these arguments, or at least that there
was so much uncertainty as to just what did occur95 that the pre-
sumption that the decedent had exercised due care for his own
safety90 was not clearly and definitely overthrown.
CONCLUSION
The writer is no friend of the defense of contributory negligence.
He dislikes it because it places upon the plaintiff, who usually is
least able to bear it, the entire burden of a loss which is caused
by the fault of both parties. He has long advocated the adoption in
Minnesota of a statute apportioning damages between the parties
according to their estimated fault, in line with the "comparative
negligence" acts which are in successful operation in a number of
other states.9 7 Such statutes do no more than sanction what every-
one knows that juries actually do whenever they are given the
chance. The reports from the other states, and particularly from
insurance companies doing business in Wisconsin, indicate that
the original opposition to the statute has disappeared; that liability
in some cases has been compensated by a reduction of verdicts in
others; that liability insurance rates in these jurisdictions are not
disproportionate to those elsewhere; and that the habitual defend-
94. "We believe, in view of our ruling with reference to the law of
negligence and contributory negligence applicable in this case, that the record
raises sufficient issues of fact to warrant a new trial. We base our conclu-
sion on the questions raised in the record as to the liability of defendants
and the contributory negligence of decedent. Additional evidence may be
available. Therefore, we conclude that in the interest of justice a new trial
should be granted, and it is so ordered." Dart v. Pure Oil Co., (Minn. 1947)
27 N. W. (2d) 555, 563.
95. In its speculative character and its uncertainty as to just what did
occur, the case resembles Getz v. Standard Oil Co., (1926) 168 Minn. 347,
210 N. W. 78, and Kentucky Independent Oil Co. v. Schnitzler, (1925) 208
Ky. 507, 271 S. W. 570, where the issue of contributory negligence was held
to be for the jury.
96. Getz v. Standard Oil Co., (1926) 168 Minn. 347, 210 N. W. 78;
Jasinuk v. Lombard, (1933) 189 Minn. 594, 250 N. W. 568; Klare v. Peter-
son, (1924) 161 Minn. 16, 200 N. W. 817; Pattock v. St. Cloud Public Service
Co., (1922) 152 Minn. 69, 187 N. W. 969.
97. Wisconsin, Nebraska, South Dakota, Mississippi. Virginia and
Georgia have such statutes applicable to railway crossing accidents only.
There are general comparative negligence acts in British Columbia, New
Brunswick and Nova Scotia, and Ontario has a statute combining compara-
tive negligence with contribution between joint tortfeasors. See Gregory,
Loss Distribution by Comparative Negligence, (1936) 21 Minn. L. Rev. 1.
The "comparative negligence" idea is of course familiar in the Federal
Employers' Liability Act, 35 Stat. 65 (1908) 45 U. S. C. §§ 51-59 (1940) and
its Minnesota equivalent, the state railway labor act, Minn. Stats., 1945,§ 219.79. Also in the Merchant Marine Act, 41 Stat. 1007 (1920) 46 U. S. C.
§ 688 (1940).
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ants have no complaint. The supreme court of Minnesota once
appealed to the legislature" for the adoption of a comparative negli-
gence act; but because of unfounded fears and the inherent con-
servation of the bar the appeal has gone unheeded.
If it had been held in the Dart Case that contributory negligence
can never be a defense where the defendant has intentionally done
an act which violates a statute, what would have been the result?
With the defense suddenly and spectacularly eliminated in a very
large percentage of all negligence actions, would not the opposition
to the comparative negligence act have collapsed like a house of
cards, and the defendants have clamored for its passage? Would
not the legislature, faced with such a sweeping and drastic change
in the law, have been compelled at last to face the issue and put the
house in order? It is at least a very interesting topic for speculation.
The opinion in Dart v. Pure Oil Co. is an excellent one, which
does much to clarify a subject that has been especially confused
and tangled in Minnesota. In the existing state of the law it seems
clearly right. But from the point of view of the ultimate future, it
is perhaps too bad that it did not go wrong.
98. "No one can appreciate more than we the hardship of depriving
plaintiff of his verdict and of all right to collect damages from defendant;
but the rule of contributory negligence, through no fault of ours, remains
in our law and gives us no alternative other than to hold that defendant is
entitled to judgment notwithstanding the verdict. It would be hard to imagine
a case more illustrative of the truth that in operation the rule of comparative
negligence would serve justice more faithfully than that of contributory
negligence. We but blind our eyes to obvious reality to the extent that we
ignore the fact that in many cases juries apply it in spite of us. But as long
as the legislature refuses to substitute the rule of comparative for that of
contributory negligence we have no option but to enforce the law in a proper
case." Holt, J., in Haeg v. Sprague, Warner & Co., (1938) 202 Minn. 425,
429-430, 281 N. W. 261.
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